Sanction Loopholes – A stab in the back?

The economic sanctions against Iran that are meant to stop Iran from gaining nuclear capability have been widely accepted by the EU since October the 15thIn fact, EU countries such as Germany, France and the UK are pressing for stronger sanctions and the Iranian economy is definitely hurting.

And yet, there are still numerous loopholes that Iran is using to circumvent sanctions. The obvious loopholes originate in numerous Non Aligned Movement (NAM) countries who side with Iran. Other loopholes were discovered in Iran’s relations with China and Russia who want to cash in on Iran’s situation.

These points of weakness are originated in the global system, and cannot be controlled (and hardly even manipulated) by the European Union. But other loopholes are in fact originating in the EU and its neighbors. 

Sweden has stated that is does not support the sanctions and there are speculations as to whether this results from Sweden’s wish to stay neutral (as in WW2), because of Swedish business with Iran. Some European businesses are eager to cash in as well – a money laundering ring was discovered in Austria, German companies still ship sensitive equipment to Iran, Italian auto manufacturers are not ready to give up their businesses in Iran and the Dutch Shell company is trying to workaround the sanctions through grain barters.

And let’s keep in mind some high-profile EU neighbors such as Switzerland who want to retain their age-old neutrality regardless of the fact that a nuclear powered Iran will not distinguish between “neutral” or EU countries. Iran’s current regime does not, in fact, debate with European countries as separate entities – It treats them as a unilateral player. 

Whether sanctions can stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions or not is still to be seen. What is certain is that while sanctions are implied, loopholes such as direct or by proxy economic cooperation, are stabbing the efficiency of these sanctions in the back: Stabbing as they are emptying the sanctions of meaning and effect, In the back as this is not done by transparent, public diplomacy style decisions but in the dark, where citizens and politicians alike are hardly aware of it.


2 thoughts on “Sanction Loopholes – A stab in the back?

  1. Pingback: Sanction Loopholes – Deutsche Bank breaches EU decisions? | IRAN 24/07

  2. Been working on the Iran crisis to stop it. No, solution to the Iranian crisis can be resolved until the Israeli program is put on the table. If the Israelis do not fall back to a reasonable posture to the threat at hand, “we”have no basis to disuss the Iran imbroglio. Israel is the problem; not Iran. It seems that once my suggestions would be fulfilled, there is hope for a nuclear-fear Middle East!

    Geoffrey Cook
    P.O. Box 4233
    Berkeley, California 94704-0233
    (510) 845-1990
    geoffrey.cook2 (Skype)

    “Collateral Damage”
    The Human Cost of War

    Crater Lake
    Nr.Klamath Falls (Ore.)

    Sitting here in one of the stunningly mysterious of places in North America, where a cone of an ancient volcano has collapsed, and filled with free-flowing water to form a bottomless lake. It is hard to contemplate the clouds of war, coalescing over the Middle East, of which this Imperial Homeland — that contains this mysterious Lake –is an actor.
    Yet, missing from the debate within this hot pursuit of war against Iran is the cost to the innocent human bystanders of a strike –- especially Iranian civilians — against the country’s nuclear sites.
    According to a recent report, published by an Iranian-American scientist, Khosrow Semanani who has a background in industrial nuclear waste and chemicals, the result would be long-lasting and devastating.
    Khosrow Semnani contends in his eighty-page monograph, The Ayatollah’s Nuclear Gamble (the Hinckley Institute of Politics & the Omid for Iran; (; the University of Utah; Provo; 2012; free that militarily striking Iran’s nuclear sites, to where the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) has attested that an inventoried three hundred and seventy-one metric tons of uranium hexafluoride has been stored.
    This chemical (uranium hexafluoride) alone could ravage the lives of, not only the Revolutionary Guards and scientific workers at or near these sites, but could endanger innocent non-combatants as well. Further any “hit” there would ransack their civilizational heritage for those who would survive.
    The reason for this bleak assessment is that a large percentage of Persians are concentrated near the target zones, and they would be exposed to highly toxic chemical fumes and radioactive fallout.
    Such plumes, in accord with the mentioned by-product to any assaults against Iran’s experimental nuclear faculties, could “destroy…lungs, [and] blind….severely; burn skin and damage other tissues and vital organs,” in accordance to Semnani’s self-funded research.
    Further, the chief investigator states that unlike traditional explosions, the risks to civilians would extend “well beyond those
    killed from exposure to the thermal and blast injuries at the nuclear sites.”
    Curiously, the potentialities outlined above may have a glimmer of hope in regards to its policy implications. That is, restraining a possible military onslaught for its dis-palatability for the potential assailant’s public.
    “This material [uranium hexafluoride] is extremely toxic in both the short-term and the long-term,” Semnani avers estimating between 5,000 through 80,000 will fall immediately: The rest over a twenty year period.
    Khosrow Semnani, although this study suggests a definite political stance shaping his view of the geo-political world, the motivation to publish this work from his own pocket are altruistic, for he desires policymakers to consider the “human dimension” when considering military action.
    He is not a player in U.S. policy creation, but he does have an interest through his ancestral antecedents. Therefore, being an Iranian in exile, he does seem to lean towards favoring regime change; accepting the Israeli political assessment of the crisis. Even so, independent “experts” on the Persian Gulf region have testified to his scientific expertise, and the probable correctness of his scientific conclusions.
    Their assessments are that he went to “considerable lengths” to make his model as trustworthy as the accessible data would allow him to do. Although I, personally, had misgivings in that he was a Persian-American, and most Iranian ex-pats are living here because they are not comfortable with the political environs of their own natal homeland, and, as alluded to above, find Tehran’s regimen to be obnoxious. Hence, there was much in his political science that displaced this e-booklet askew for me.
    Thus, I sent it out to four individuals who were qualified to investigate his scientific research. What I did receive back was not encouraging regarding uranium hexafluoride (which is not used in most other nuclear programs for non- or peaceful ends: From a bio-physicist, “…Irradiation effects are bad enough, but pale compared to this toxic effect.”
    Therefore, I passed on all the information upon which I am composing this essay to my colleague in Lebanon, who writes in Arabic, but is respected in the Shia world to get the above mentioned monograph to the attention of Persia’s scientific community to urge them to move any redundant uranium hexafluoride away from the threatened target zones near densely populated districts to safer locales until this stupidity subsides! I, also, urge my readers here upon the Observer, if they have any connection to that community scientific community to point out the study to which I have allude.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )


Connecting to %s